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Abstract
Temporary recruitment is a fast growing labor market with candidates, usually profession-
als, looking for contract positions in today’s fast evolving and dynamic economy. While
two-sided matching algorithms have been applied to some labor markets during the past
decades, they usually assume a static environment in which the strategic interactions be-
tween candidates and employers are designed without considering dynamic changes in
market participants. In recent years, the advance of Internet and mobile technologies has
enabled the implementation of large scale online labor markets which can capture the dy-
namics of the participants in a near real time manner.
In this thesis, I study how to improve the effectiveness and the efficiency of recruitment
processes in the context of temporary labor markets. The key challenge is how to design
two-sided matching algorithms to accommodate dynamic changes in market participants.
To have a better understanding of the challenge and possible solutions, I first analyzed the
problem using the Environment-Based Design (EBD) methodology. The analyzing results
show that two aspects need to by improved in the proposed two-sided matching algorithm:
the efficiency, which is the responsiveness of the algorithm, and the effectiveness, which is
measured by the consistency of solutions generated by the algorithm when dynamics are
introduced.
Based on the results derived from EBD analysis, I designed two algorithms to improve
the efficiency and the effectiveness. For the efficiency, I designed a request-accumulated
iii
deferred acceptance algorithm, which is a modification of the classical deferred acceptance
algorithm. In addition, I designed a repair-based two-sided matching algorithm to improve
solution consistency when changes are introduced to the market. The performance of the
proposed algorithms are evaluated through a computational study. The results show that
the efficiency and the effectiveness design requirements are satisfied.
iv
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1.1 Background and Motivation
Recruitment refers to the process of sourcing, screening, selecting, and contracting people
for a job vacancy within an organization. The recruitment industry comprises of recruit-
ment agencies. It provides services of recruiting staff to meet some employers’ require-
ment. It also helps to find employers for staffs. The process of recruitment occurs in
different sectors of business enterprises, such as IT service, consultant, translation, and
transportation. However, recruitment agencies are facing some real problems. The first one
is how to recommend the appropriate candidates to employers or recommend the appro-
priate employer to candidates in a quick and efficient manner. Usually, the situation is as
follows: a manager of a recruitment agency spends a whole day contacting candidates to
see if there is a candidate who is interested in the employer. The recruitment agency can
prevent themselves from wasting time if the manager can directly pick up the appropriate
candidate. The second problem is, because of the increasing growing market, more than
half of industries provide temporary and contract staffing placement. Temporary recruit-
ment agencies place workers in jobs on a contract or temporary basis. Temporary workers,
also called contract employees, make the fastest growing segment of the global workforce.
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Temporary recruitment needs employers and staff to participate in the market dynamically.
A common situation is that the recruitment manager spends lots of time to find an appropri-
ate employer or candidate, when suddenly, new members from two sides join in and ask for
the recruitment service. The recruitment manager may find, for some original employer,
the most appropriate candidate is now among the new bunch of candidates. The service
markets whose participants vary constantly make it hard for the recruiting agency to find
appropriate employers or candidates for their clients. Physical interview and manual as-
sessment are traditional recruitment process. However, a large pool of candidates will cost
the recruitment agency manager enormous amounts of time in interview and assessment.
Moreover, the employers have various requirements, which mean managers need to change
standards for each employer requirement. In the dynamic market, not only some new em-
ployers who provide job positions might leave the market, but also the existing employers
may also change their preferences over time. Even if the manager has a name list containing
various candidates for various employers, he may still meet a big problem on recruitment.
Sometimes, the most appropriate candidate for some employers may not be appropriate to
this candidate. Therefore, it is neither efficient nor effective to let manager assign the can-
didate to specific employer in matching a large pool of candidates. Technological advances
have moved the job posting from paper media to Internet applications. Internet-based re-
cruitment solutions can be rather efficient in dealing with fast responsiveness. However,
due to the lack of a powerful matching algorithm, current online recruitment systems can-
not match exact results effectively, which results in an increase of mismatching risks and
costly human intervention. Moreover, this two-sided matching is a rather complex process
mainly due to dealing with a dynamic recruitment requirements in a time-sensitive envi-
ronment. Therefore, in this paper, we attempt to analyze the dynamic environment and
formalize the challenges of recruitment in temporary/contract staffing, and to propose an
effective approach to improve its effectiveness and efficiency based on these challenges.
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In my research, Environment-based design (EBD) methodology [23, 24] will be used to
establish such analysis and formalization. This will be explained in section 2.1
The objective of this research is to apply two-sided matching algorithm in improving
the efficiency and effective of the recruitment for the recruitment agency. We focus our
attention on the temporary labor market. We noticed that the temporary labor market is
dynamic. The two-sided matching algorithm was initially designed for the marriage mar-
ket. Then some person applied it in a specific labor market. The specific labor market is
to assign medical interns to the hospitals. Both the marriage market and the medical labor
market, they are relative static. In their assumption, they do not need to face the require-
ment for constantly joining or leaving members. However, in our temporary labor market,
not only need we to fast response of the members changes happen, but we also try to main
the consistency among the results. We may generate different results based on the dynamic
market, our customers prefer their result being more consistency.
Therefore, One of our goals pertaining to the deferred acceptance algorithm in the mar-
ket is to improve the responsiveness of the algorithm, leading to a reduction in the running
time of the program in order to solve the problem of fast responsiveness
The other is to modify the algorithm to cater for the requirement of the dynamic market
where variances occurring in the market may turn the previous stable match into an unstable
one. The repair-based algorithm is designed for this kind of situation. It uses the idea
that repairing the unstable match based on the previous stable one can solve the challenge
caused by the dynamic market.
1.2 Scope and Approach
Our approach is to find the core conflicts by applying a design methodology of the environ-
ment based design (EBD). I propose a request accumulated deferred acceptance (RADA)
algorithm to extend the classical two-sided matching algorithm, by decreasing its running
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time through optimizing the operation execution sequence. The RADA algorithm can im-
prove the responsiveness rate of the deferred acceptance algorithm.
In addition, I propose a repair-based algorithm, extending classical context to dynamic
circumstance in order to fix the unstable match caused by the dynamic market. It can reduce
the variance among results generate by the algorithm so that it can improve the consistency
of the results, further to improve the satisfactory of customers.
1.3 Thesis Organization
This thesis is organized as follow: Chapter 2 introduces how to analyze recursively the
problem via Environment based design (EBD). Chapter 3 reviews some papers about two-
sided matching, from two aspects, including the two-sided matching model study and the
two-sided matching algorithm study. Chapter 4 first presents two-sided matching market,
defines the basic model based on the market. Then propose an request accumulated deferred
acceptance algorithm based on the classical one proposed by [9]. Chapter 5 divides the
market into static market and dynamic market and uses the repair-based algorithm to solve
the dynamic problem of the temporary labor market. Chapter 6 presents some experiments
to validate the algorithms’ efficiency improvement. Chapter 7 draws some conclusions and





In this chapter, I am trying to use the environment based design (EBD) methodology to
analysis the abstract problem we discuss on the background. I would like to get the critical
conflict that the recruitment agency happened to.
2.2 Research Methodology
The EBD methodology focuses on the changes in the environment, which applies the re-
cursive evolution in the processes of designing a problem. Three basic activities can be
comprised into this design problem: environment analysis, conflict identification, and so-
lution generation. The main purpose of this is through environment analysis, we can detect
that what conflicts it has in the problem context. Based on this, it is reasonable to propose
the corresponding solutions to solve the current conflict. However, the real problems is
not always as easy to solve, as usually, it will produce new conflicts when the solutions
have been used. Therefore, indefinite problems is hard. It gives us enough reasons to use
EBD methodology to face such design problem. Using EBD methodology, allows for a
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more logical direction to follow. Rely on the recursive object model (ROM) diagram, it
can transfer the design problem description to graph, representing its linguistic structure
and demonstrate the relationships among the objects. Then, dig into the design problem
via asking two kinds of questions. One kind question is trying to complement information
based on ROM diagram for designer. Opposite these generic questions, the other kinds
questions are proposed based on the product life cycle, in order to get designer realize the
potential requirements of the design. After several rounds of such two kinds of questions
asking be run recursively, although the original environment is updated, the direction of
design problem analysis remains the same, which is the critical conflict identification. The
relationships among all iterations is called the performance network in EBD that is impor-
tant, as in the following, the solution proposal are based on critical conflict that can be infer
through performance networking.
2.3 1st Round Analysis
For a given design problem, we can initially describe it using natural language following
the template below.
Meta-verb (e.g. propose design, develop) product (S) to Verb.(I) noun (E)
According to the knowledge of designer, for example, the initial design problem in this
case can be semantically described as follows:
“Propose an approach to improve effectiveness and efficiency of temporary and con-
tract placement."
In above sentence, the “approach" is our goal. In order to implement this goal, it is
critical to improve the effectiveness and efficiency in terms of temporary contract place-
ment. Based on current knowledge we have, it is necessary to make clear about the issue
on “placement" and the extent for “temporary", and then, to finally answer the question on
the effectiveness and efficiency based on temporary and contract placement, the approach
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to improve it can be proposed consequently.
Therefore, in the 1st round of environment analysis, we can get some questions in the
following table.
Table 1: 1st round Generic question asking-answering
Questions Answers
Who propose approach to “improve ef-
fectiveness and efficiency of temporary
staffing service"?
The recruitment agencies propose an ap-
proach to “improve effectiveness and effi-
ciency of temporary staffing service"
Why propose an approach to “improve
effectiveness and efficiency of tempo-
rary staffing service"?
To make more profit by satisfying cus-
tomers’ needs, the recruitment agencies
propose an approach to “improve effective-
ness and efficiency of temporary staffing
service"
What is “temporary staffing service"? Temporary staffing service is the match be-
tween highly skilled professionals and tem-
porary and contractual positions. It in-
cludes four phases: sourcing, searching,
matching and contracting.
What is “effectiveness"? Effectiveness is the degree to which some-
thing is successful in producing a desired
result.
What is “efficiency"? Efficiency is the extent to resources is used
for the intended.
What is “effectiveness and efficiency"
in “temporary staffing service"?
Effectiveness of temporary staffing service
is the degree to which temporary staffing
service is successful in producing a desired
result.
Efficiency of temporary staffing service is
the extent to which temporary staffing ser-
vice is used for the intended task.
What is the meaning of improving ef-
fectiveness and efficiency in temporary
staffing service?
Since the subject of the verb “improve" is
the product “approach", this question is left
for solution generation
After appending the original problem statement with these answers, it gets digged into
7
the problem. The updated problem statement is following:
Recruitment agency proposes an approach to improve degree of success to produce de-
sired results and extent to use resource. The match includes sourcing, searching, matching,
contracting between high skilled professionals and temporary contractual positions. The
match produce desired results and use resources. To make more profit by satisfying cus-
tomer’s need, the recruitment agencies propose an approach to “improve effectiveness and
efficiency of temporary staffing service"
Each action in the problem statement is called interaction, from the above updated
problem statement. Identify interaction is a right way to understand their relationships.
Because performance network, namely interaction relationship, can help us find which
interaction is the root that constrain the others. The critical conflict of our problem is
hidden in root interaction. The performance network table is below.
Table 2: Interactions and their description
Interaction Description
I1 Recruitment agency proposes an approach.
I2 Approach improves degree.
I3 Approach improves extent.
I4 Match produces results.
I5 Placement uses resources.
I6 Recruitment agency satisfy customer.
I7 Recruitment agency makes profit.
And the performance networking is below.
When converting these answers to interaction relationships into diagram, it is easy to
find that the root interaction is. The interaction diagram is below:
In the “Reactive conflict and active conflict" Figure Figure 1, reactive conflict is the
conflict caused by several interactions that are taking up identical resource, while active
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Table 3: Performance networking 1st interaction
Questions Answers
What is the relationship between I2 and I3 There is no relationship between I2
and I3.
What is the relationship between I4 and I5 I5 constrains I4 .
What is the relationship between I2 and I6 I2 constrains I6.
What is the relationship between I3 and I6 I3 constrains I6.
Figure 1: Reactive conflict and Active conflict 1st
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conflict is caused by interactions that are short of resources. In my case, the active conflict
is caused by Interaction I5. It is “Placement uses resources". The active conflict is that the
placement that match candidates and positions is short of resources.
As consequently, it is necessary to give more attention on Interaction I5.
Table 4: Generic question asking-answering 1st interaction
Questions Answers
What are resources? The resources refer to time, money, and customers.
Customers are employers who provide temporary po-
sitions, and employees who get temporary positions.
2.4 2nd Round Analysis
We have noticed that the above answer, explaining what resource may be consumed in my
case, showing us new interactions. It is recursive processes by keeping ask and answer
about the questions on case environment, leading us understand the case environment well.
Therefore, the new interactions are added in the following Table 5.
Interaction I8 and I9 are the new added ones that reveal more information for us. Con-
tinue to asking their relationships and the answer Table 6 is below.
As result, the updated relationship among interactions in Figure 2 can show us I8 and
I9 are the root for the whole interaction in current round.
2.5 3rd Round Analysis
Aiming at the interactions I8 and I9, we can propose further questions in order to dig into
the market environment, in the Table 7
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Table 5: Interaction and description 2nd interaction
Interaction Description
I1 Recruitment agency proposes an approach.
I2 Approach improves degree.
I3 Approach improves extent.
I4 Placement produces results.
I5 Placement uses resources.
I6 Recruitment agency satisfies customer.
I7 Recruitment agency makes profit.
I8 Employers provide positions.
I9 Employees get positions.
Table 6: Performance networking 2nd interaction
Questions Answers
What is the relationship be-
tween I5 and I8?
I5 constrain I8.
What is the relationship be-
tween I5 and I9?
I5 constrain I9.
Figure 2: Reactive conflict and Active conflict 2nd round
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Table 7: Generic question asking-answering 3rd interaction
Questions Answers
Why the employers provide tempo-
rary contractual positions?
To find an appropriate employee for job opening,
employers provide position. Job opening is a po-
sition available for employee.
Why the employees get temporary
contractual positions?
To fulfill the employee’s goal, employees get
temporary contractual positions.
The above answer update interactions further by extract new interactions in the answers.
The Table 8 shows us all the interactions.
Table 8: Interactions and description 3rd interaction
Interaction Description
I1 Recruitment agency proposes an approach.
I2 Approach improves degree.
I3 Approach improves extent.
I4 Placement produces results.
I5 Placement uses resources.
I6 Recruitment agency satisfies customer.
I7 Recruitment agency makes profit.
I8 Employers provide positions.
I9 Employees get positions.
I10 Employers find Employee.
I11 Employees fulfill goal.
The interaction I10 and I11 are brought into, it is necessary to identify what relationships
between new interactions and previous part. Table 9 show us performance network in 3rd
round.
From the Figure 3, we noticed that Interaction I8 and I9 are constraint by I10 and I11,
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Table 9: Performance networking 3rd interaction
Questions Answers
What is the relationship between I10 and I8 ? I10 constrain I8.
What is the relationship between I11 and I9? I11 constrain I9.
respectively.
Figure 3: Reactive conflict and Active conflict 3rd round
Based on this, we noticed that our problem environment actually can be converted into
several interactions. In such that job market, the employers provide positions (I8), employ-
ees get positions (I9); employers find employees (I10), employees fulfill goals (I11).Our
problem statement is “ how to find employees for employers and how to let employees get
job position in job market."
Finally, the original problem statement: “Propose an approach to improve effective-
ness and efficiency of temporary and contract placement", converting into the statement is
below:
1. Let an employee profile fit the job opening requirement in order for an employer to
find an employee;
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Table 10: Generic question asking-answering 4th interaction
Questions Answers
How to find employees for employers ? Job fit goals.
How to let employees get job position ? Employees’ Profile fit requirements.
2. Let the job opening fit an employee goal in order for an employee to get a job open-
ing.
2.6 Summary
From above, we find that we need such a algorithm to address these sub-problems derived
from the abstract problem, with which we can not only meet employees’ requirement, but
also cater for employers’ requirement. The two-sided matching algorithm has such fea-
tures. In the following, I introduce the classical two-sided matching algorithm in chapter 4.
Through this classical algorithm, we can find it still has some issues that make this not
suitable for our problem perfectly. For the sake of this, I introduce a dynamic algorithm for





So far, most people studied two-sided matching field from two aspects. Because two-sided
matching is related to the game theory, many people try to study this from explore its
model with the view of game theory, connecting it to market theory. Another aspect is
try to find a more efficient way to implement it. My literature review is divided into two
parts. section 3.2 collects several papers related the two-sided matching model study, while
section 3.3 is mainly focuses on using various methods to improve the efficiency of their
algorithm.
3.2 Two-Sided Matching Model Study
Gale and Shapley [9] proposed a paper that describes the marriage problem and college
admissions problem in detail. The admissions problem is that universities select students
who apply for them according to their own quota and their preferences. Simultaneously,
students also decide which universities to apply for according to their preferences. The
marriage problem is that men marry to women who also have preferences over man at
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same time. The difference between the admissions problem and the marriage problem is
that in the marriage problem, man can only marry to one woman, so can woman, while in
the admissions problem, a college can admit many students, and student can only enroll into
one college. Therefore, D. Gale and L.S. wanted to introduce a model solving two sides
selection problem. Gale and Shapley introduced some basic concepts related to the criteria
on how to assign applicant to the colleges. Gale and Shapley [9]thought that algorithm
can assign the agents in one side to other side’s. For example, algorithm assign applicants
to appropriate college in order to let the matching including applicants and colleges keep
stable. Based on this, they proposed two-sided matching algorithm that can generate a
stable matching.
Dr. Kirby tried to apply the Gale and Shapley algorithm [9] into the matching between
trip origin and trip destination. According to the paper, a person’s preference between
different modes of travel would be evaluated by associating a utility function with each
mode [15].
Dr. Kelso and Dr. Crawford studied the labor market, in which firms and workers are
two disjoint set. He viewed this as a resource allocation problem from the viewpoint of
theory general economic equilibrium in market economies. He found that there was uncer-
tainty on the part of participants existing in the labor market, which was a critical features
for the market. Moreover, some conflicts limit workers be assigned to one job. Therefore,
Dr. Kelso tried some other dimension: he studied the outcome of competitive sorting pro-
cesses in markets. Dr. Crawford generalized Gale and Shapley’s deferred-acceptance pro-
cedure [9]to the case where a money good is present. Their algorithm is "salary-adjustment
process" that can be used to establish sufficient conditions for the existence of the core in
some markets. The author argue that all workers are gross substitutes, although the work-
ers’ choice is discrete. The author also studied the equilibrium of the adjustment process.
Dr. Kelso also thought that Gale and Shapley’s result is equilibrium and biased for agents
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on the side of the market that “sending request". In addition to this, the author studied the
situation of adding agents to the market. Because new participants will affect the stability
of the market, author discussed the effects of some new members add into the market [3].
Dr. Roth discussed this matching problem on standpoint of game-theoretic aspects [16].
He focused on the situation where whether participants from two disjoint sides would reveal
honestly their preference. In the resulting non-cooperative game, it is a dominant strategy
for each participant to reveal his preference honestly. In such a procedure, a member can-
not get better outcome if he misrepresents his preference. And he drew the conclusion that
matching procedure either yields a stable matching or give participants the incentive to re-
veal their true preference. Besides, he thought that there exists such matching procedure
which generate a stable matching and also gives members from one of two sides of agents
the incentive to reveal their true preference. Dr. Roth thought a market is completely cen-
tralized, in which all members reveal their preference. He proposed the results, because he
thought that any possible incentive would misrepresent participants’ true preference. Fi-
nally, Dr. Roth discussed the student-admission market and found that the student-optimal
stable matching give students no incentive to misrepresent their preferences. The reason
is that in that procedure, the matching generated by algorithm is a dominant strategy for
student to reveal their preference. Although the potential misrepresentation would come
from college side, colleges may have less scope for it, because of regulation and law, and
incentive can affect only one side to reveal the true, which can also deduce stable match.
Dr. Peter extended the stable marriage problem by allowing individuals to provide
weak ordering preference. Gale and Sharpley [9] proved that if the preference is strictly
ordering, it can find a stable matching by their algorithm. Dr. Peter thought the strict pref-
erence assumption is not realistic. He mentioned in most applications it seems much more
natural and less restrictive to rely on weak preference orders. Besides this, he proposed it
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can expand the stability criterion of assignment. Based on this, he studied majority deci-
sion [10] and proved assignment derived from majority decision can also be stable, if it is
a unique assignment which is preferred by a majority to all other assignments. And also he
argued there is no assignment can be preferred by a majority to any stable assignment, if
all preferences orders are strict. In his paper, Dr. Peter defined the concept of majority as-
signment, generally speaking, if there are more persons agree one assignment than another
assignment, it means the fore assignment is preferred to the latter one. This definition was
proposed based on voting theory. According to this definition, if there exists one assign-
ment to which there no other assignment can be preferred, this assignment is a majority
assignment. Moreover, if for any assignment, there exits one assignment that is preferred
to others, the assignment is strong majority assignment. Dr. Peter found if the preferences
are strict, then all stable assignments are majority assignments. And he also proved that
any strong majority assignment is stable. Dr. Peter used a new concept which is choice
number to look for the assignment. The choice number is the number of objects that rank
before some specified object in a preference. Dr. Peter designed an approach to minimize
the sum of choices number to get strong majority as well as stable matching.
Dr. Dolton [8] summarized the marriage game in terms of assignment game with indi-
visibilities, giving a new proof of the existence of the core for this game situation, analyzing
the condition necessary for the core to be unique.
Dr. Roth [18] proposed an opposite opinion against the view trusted by most researchers
who believe that “college admission problem" is similar to “marriage problem". In his view,
there is no stable matching procedure in which it is a dominant strategy for colleges to
reveal their true preference, maybe there are exist outcomes that all colleges strictly prefer
to the College optimal stable outcome. Dr. Roth focused on the “marriage problem" two
years ago, and proposed in “marriage problem" there is no such stable matching procedure
that can make itself to be dominant strategy for all agent, which means there is no such
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procedure that makes all agents in the market state honestly their true preference. [16] Dr.
Roth summarized the Gale and Shapley algorithm [9] can generate the Man optimal stable
matching, and found it is a dominant strategy for the male side in the marriage problem.
However for the college admissions problem, Dr. Roth did not think it is a dominant
strategy for college side. That is because he thought a college would not prefer one stable
matching to another unless the college had already specified its preference over outcome.
The outcome assigned to the college is not just one student but many students, which is not
the same as marriage problem.
Dr. Roth [17] discussed the job-matching in the labor market. This market is similar to
the marriage problem, but the difference is that each firm that can hire a set of employees
and each worker can be accepted by a set of jobs. He found that the interests of the firms
and workers are polarized over the set of stable matching. According to Gale and Shapley’s
algorithm, it can generate a stable matching that is firm-optimal stable matching, which
means the best stable outcome for each firm. However, it is also means this result is the
worst for every worker. Similarly, there is also a worker-optimal stable matching that can
be generated by Gale and Shapley’s algorithm in which the outcome is best for worker
but worst for each firm. Based on this, Dr. Roth would like to study the cause for such
polarization of interests. He drew the conclusion about the polarization of interests. He
believed that these occurrences in the matching model do not depend on the many of the
special assumptions made in the model. He cannot explain the reason, but he can prove the
assumptions, like the preference restriction, is not the reason to generate the polarization
of interests in the stable matching set. As we know, for a two-sided matching problem, we
can get several matches that meet for the definition of “stable", but we can only obtain two
optimal stable matches. They are optimal for one of sides, respectively. Making it clear on
the structure of the set of stable matching is necessary, because we can analysis it to find if
there exists a method that can find arbitrary stable matches or find all stable matches. Dr.
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Roth is concerned the concrete conflict and coincidence of workers’ and firms’ interests of
whole set of stable matching. But he also admits that there are still many open questions
remaining.
Dr. Roth [1] guessed that market failures may be associated with instability of the
outcomes generated by centralized deterministic matching procedures. But he also did not
observed many entry-level labor markets and other two-sided matching situations which do
not employ centralized matching procedures experience such failure. He tried to start from
an arbitrary matching, the process of allowing randomly chosen blocking pairs to match
will converge to a stable matching with probability one. At last, he found that there has no
such procedure that can not only generate stable matching, but also make it be dominant
strategy for all agents to state their true preference. He also thought that Gale and Shapley’s
algorithm can generate stable matches in terms of the true preference. This algorithm may
have an incentive to misrepresent their preference.
Dr. Abeledo [11] studied characterized sets of mutually acceptable pairs of individu-
als in the stable matching problem for which a stable matching exists under all preference
profiles. He also proposed a notion of acceptability graphs that can be viewed as a repre-
sentation of the underlying social structure of mutually acceptable pairs. The acceptability
graphs is bipartite. Dr. Abeledo found the number of men and the number of women is
equal in the original marriage problem proposed by Gale ans Shapely. He thought the more
realistic situation is one where the number of men and women are unequal, even where
each man or woman holds the incomplete preference ordering, which indicate that the in-
dividuals outside that subset are unacceptable partners. Dr. Abeledo thought a man and a
woman are mutually acceptable, if they are on each other’s list of acceptable partners. In
addition to this, he also introduced a acceptability graph while trying to solve the stable
matching problem from the view of a graph theoretic aspect. The stable matching problem
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consists of a bipartite graph and an ordering mapping. Dr. Abeledo treated the acceptabil-
ity graph’s vertex set as the member of market, and the edges of this graph as the mutually
acceptable pairs. Dr. Abeledo tried to solve the stable matching problem by introducing
the concept of acceptability graphs. Besides, he also checked the conditions for stability
based on the acceptability graph.
Dr. Zhou [25] proved that even though agents reveal their their preferences strate-
gically, the Gale-Shaley’s algorithm still yields stable matching with respect to the true
preferences. Dr. Zhou extended Roth’s [17] result on if members in market revealing their
true preferences.
Dr. Tamura [21] proposed a counterexample for D. E. Knuth’s view that any matching
can be transformed to any stable matching. This paper argue that it can only be transformed
to some stable matching. He also give an algorithm to find either such stable matching. The
transformation from unstable matching to other matching relies on b-interchange, which
refers to a blocking math, assigning them their preferred choice respectively. Cyclically
using this b-interchange, we can transform unstable one to some stable match.
Dr. Csima [14] proposed a timetabling algorithm using matrix terminology in his treat-
ment. He assumed men and women only date with each other in unit time for constant
time in marriage market. Therefore, the matching among men and women ca be treated as
r-regular graph.
Dr. Manlove [5] focused on the issue that the preference list of the participants are
not necessarily complete and not necessarily totally ordered. Based on this, the author
proved the existence of a 2-approximation algorithm for the problem. He introduced the
notion of “ties" to indicate the situation that some of individuals might be indifferent among
some members of the opposite sex side. Therefore, if there involves tie in market, then the
stability of the stable matching would be weak stability.
Dr. Dutta [4] proposed an assumption that the composition of one’s co-worker can
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affect the preference. Firstly under this assumption, the matching is nonempty. We first
consider the case when subsets of the individuals are couples. We assume that each couple
prefers a matching in which they are matched together with an institution rather than an-
other one where they are paired with different institutions. There is a unanimous ranking
of all workers, and any worker prefers to join a set of workers containing higher-ranked
workers.
3.3 Two-Sided Matching Algorithm Study
"The stable marriage problem" [7] written by DG. McVitie, et, al. They indicated that an
extension algorithm based Gale & Shapley’s algorithm (G&S algorithm). The extend algo-
rithm executes the G&S algorithm recursively in order to generate all the stable matches.
Dr. Vitie analyzed G&S algorithm, finding that the G&S algorithm consist of two op-
erations, which are “sending request" action and “decision making" action. These two
operations are run alternatively to deduce the stable matching. Therefore, they tried to
break up a pair of stable match manually, and called G&S algorithm is executed again to
attain a different stable match. But abusing break stable matching randomly may leads the
same stable solution being obtained many times. The author solved it by constraining the
algorithm, setting it up two rules. First of all, order the agent in two side set. One of the
rules is starting at a stable matching obtained by a successful breaking operation on agent i
in one side, then break operation may only be performed on element ≥ i. The second rule
is in a break operation starting on agent i on sending side in the two sides, two sides can be
separate into sender side and receiver side. Agent from sender side can send request to op-
posite side, agent from receiver side only make decision with agents received. Only agent
≥ i may do “sending request action". With the help of two rules, author proved that when
the break operation is applied to a set of stable match, it is terminated successfully with
the result set of stable match. Besides, according to Gale and Shapley’s algorithm [9], the
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stable match derived from G&S algorithm is optimal for one side of two sides according
to which side is set as sender side. Dr. Vitie thought that any stable solution, excluding
one sided optimal stable matching, can be obtained from this optimal stable matching by
successive application of the break operation. And the break operation with the two rules
given above allows each stable matching to be obtained only once.
Dr. Wilson analyzed the stable matching assignment algorithm [22]. Dr. McVitie
and Dr. Wilson proposed an algorithm call algorithm 411 [7]. This algorithm extended
Gale and Sharpley’s idea [9] to generate one stable matching by using two main operations
including “sending request" action and “decision making" action. But Dr. Wilson made
some changes in the execution sequence of the algorithm. In algorithm 411, they let the
“sending request" action happen one by one rather than simultaneously do as in the G&S
algorithm. He tried to calculate the executing time of “sending request" action, and found as
the problem sizes (n) increases, the number of “sending request" actions, which is directly
related to the number of Complexity is of the order of nlogn. The G&S algorithm is of the
order ∼= n5/2.
Dr. McVitie and Dr. Wilson applied their algorithm into solving the problem of British
university admissions. Moreover, they observed the effect of the large size of this prob-
lem [6]. In this case, the scale of the problem is determined mainly by the number of
students applicants and the number of University courses offered. The number of stu-
dents is about 110,000, while the number of university courses seems about 8000. Dr.
McVitie considered two basic algorithms developed to apply into this large-scale univer-
sity assignment problem. The Gale and Shapley algorithm [9] would let all applicants do
the “sending request" actions simultaneously according to their own preferences. And the
other side, namely the college side will receive these requests and makes decision. since
there are 110,000 student applicants initially, it is a big challenge to the memory to hold
such amounts of data. The reason why algorithm 411 [22] is better than G&S algorithm [9]
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with respect to the aspect of large scale problem size is the former involve applicant to “
send request" one by one while the latter loads all the initial data at once time, which is a
burden for the computer’s computing capability. However algorithm 411 involves a lot of
searching for one applicant, which is an inefficient process because it needs more “decid-
ing" actions executed by the other side. Dr. McVitie choose algorithm 411 and found that
a small assignment of 30 courses and 800 students required 4-5 minutes run time. And 292
courses and 9000 students required 61 minutes. The considerable increases would occur, if
we to use more of applicants and courses.
Dr. Itoga [12] published a paper in which they summarize the two algorithms proposed
by Gale and McVitie, and discuss the upper bound for the stable marriage problem. When
he got the optimal stable matching by following Gale and Shapley’s algorithm, he proved
that at most one girl ends up with her last choice as a partner, and the maximum number
of stages for a problem is n2 − 2n + 2 where size equals to n. The number of stages is
derived by counting the number of “sending request" actions used at each stage. Therefore,
Dr. Itoga took the number of stages required to solve the problem into account to measure
the computational complexity of it, and found that in most complex, it n2 − 2n+ 2.
Dr. Itoga [13] provided an in-depth analysis of the work of stable marriage problem, he
extended the preliminary set of participants to dynamical participants, and also allowed cer-
tain relative preference conditions to be maintained. Finally, he proposed several theorems,
referring to extendable dynamical agent situation. He studied and found that the algorithm
provided by Gale and Shapley [9] relying on static requirement of the matching problem. If
the requirement of any participant is changed after the stable matching generation, the pre-
vious stable matching may not be stable any more. Therefore, he relaxed this requirement
by allowing the additional participants to join after a stable matching has been found. He
thought the method starting all over and applying the Gale and Shapley’s algorithm to fix
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the new stable matching is not efficient. To solve this problem, he introduced a ripple op-
eration, instead of repeatedly applying Gale and Shapley’s algorithm. The ripple operation
consist of a sequence of steps. Based on previous stable matching, it allows new members
to execute “sending request" action, which would lead corresponding opposite member to
be rejected, lead further the rejected members to execute their “sending request". The pro-
cess can be executed repeatedly, and it would be interrupted by one of two situations. The
first situation is all members of the “sending request" side are on hold; the second one is
some the member of the “sending request" side are rejected by all opposite side members.
Dr. Itoga compared two kinds of algorithm in terms of complexity computation, and found
the average number of “sending request" action of Gale and Shapley’s algorithm is twice
the corresponding result in his algorithm. The main reason to decrease the complexity is his
algorithm generate result based previous stable matching, which means it can omit the first
round “sending request" and set the corresponding pair in stable matching as hold rather
than generate the same pair as ones in previous stable matching.
Dr. Irving [19] summarized that Gale and Shapley’s algorithm could generate a stable
matching that either man optimal stable matching or woman optimal stable matching in the
marriage market. And he found that the man-optimal stable matching sacrifices woman’s
requirement to meet men requirement, leading all man in the context can not find better
choice in other stable matches. Dr. Irving focused on problem of finding a stable matching
more equitable for two side’s requirements. He tried to design an algorithm to maximize
the average satisfaction of members based on stable matching. In his opinion, he can mea-
sure the average satisfaction of members in the market via the position of partner in the
preference list. Dr. Irving used graph-theoretic methods which is an O(n4) algorithm. Dr.
Irving obtained the position number of each man’s partner in corresponding man’s prefer-
ence list and the position number of each woman’s partner, and then calculated the sum
of position number. He thought a stable match is optimal stable match if it has minimum
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possible value. After defining the criteria, Dr. Irving introduced a concept called “Ro-
tations", which is a sequence of man/woman pairs where the woman in some pair is the
favorite choice of the man in the pair, and the woman in next pair is the second choice of
the man in last pair. Dr. Irving thought in the male optimal solution, assign the second
choice of each man instead of the favorite one, leading another stable matching. Based on
this, Dr. Irving proposed another algorithm based graph-theoretical algorithm, finding all
the rotations; and then construct a graph of the weighted rotation poset, and then find the
maximum-weight closed subset based on the poset, and then eliminate the rotations in that
closed subset to obtain the optimal stable matching. Dr. Irving emphasized the main point
in the algorithm is the maximum weight closed subset can be obtained from the graph.
Dr. Tseng [20]argued that the stable marriage problem can be solved by a divide-and-
conquer approach. but it appears to be hard to obtain the average performance of their
parallel algorithm. The parallel algorithm consists of two parts, the first one is dividing,
which first divided the agents into two parts, and updated the preference matrix according
to their different group. Recursively applied this algorithm, then applied merging algorithm
to combine sub-result based on different group. In the process of the divide-and-conquer,
Dr. Tseng first divided the problem into four sub-problems that contains only one man, if
he wanted to obtain man-optimal stable matching. Then the approach begins to merge the
sub-solution for each sub-problem into one solution. If different men pair with different
women, it can combine two pairs simply. When different men choose the same woman,
it should consider that woman’s preference to decide which man is held temporarily. Dr.
Tseng also talked about the worst case of his parallel algorithm. According to Wilson [22],
the maximal number of “sending request" action to obtain the man-optimal stable matching
is n2 − n + 1 for the size of n. Based on this the probability of worst case is less than
4.7 ∗ 10−16 when size of n equal to 8.
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3.4 Summary
From the literature review above, I notice that nowadays papers study this field, with a
assumption that the market is relatively static. But the temporary labor market I face is
such a market that lots of members join or leave so that I cannot wait for a time to execute
algorithm to calculate results. In the following chapter, I first introduce the classical two-
sided matching with its model, criteria and implementation in chapter 4. After that, We
can tell more clearly about its limitation for our problem. Then I introduce two dynamic






We have already defined our problem. we also know that two-sided matching algorithm
can solve the related problem. Therefore, I introduce related things in this chapter. In
section 4.2, I first define the temporary labor market model and matching in this market.
Then, I introduce the criteria of stable status for matching in the market. Lastly, I imple-
ment the classical deferred acceptance algorithm. However, I face the situation that a fast
responsiveness is required in the dynamic market, I propose a request-accumulated deferred
acceptance algorithm in order to solve this problem.
4.2 Classical Deferred Acceptance Algorithm
Gale and Shapley [9] proposed a paper that describes the marriage problem and the college
admissions problem in detail. Actually, a similar approach for the temporary labor market
can also be used. In that market, employers and candidates spend large amounts of time
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matching, according to their own criteria. For example, a candidate who wants to work
in a company near their apartment has limited working positions to choose from, while an
employer who can provides position that is easily accessible areas may attract fewer can-
didates. When trying to improve the efficiency of matching a candidate and an employer,
the first problem is how to satisfy both sides. For the sake of argument, various candidates
have various requirements the employers’ side. The difficulty in this circumstance is that
for a given position some candidates may prefer it while others may not. Similarly, it is
possible that some prospective candidates do not like to work for some employers while
these employers want to hire them.
4.2.1 Temporary Job Market Model
In this temporary labor market, candidates want to find an appropriate position provided
by employers, and employers also try to find optimal prospective candidates. Each candi-
date has their own preferences over all the working positions, and each employer has their
own requirement, which form unique preferences over candidates. The whole market is
dynamic, which means new candidates or employers join or leave the market at any time,
therefore, other members need modify their preferences respectively. Also, the preferences
of some existing agents (candidates and employers) may be modified due to some reasons.
In one word, the changes happen on the market lead to modification for members’ pref-
erences of the market, which affect the accuracy of our results. In order to solve this, we
need to define some concepts.
There are disjoint sets of candidates and employers, C = {c1, c2, . . . , cn} and E =
{e1, e2, . . . , em}, for each element in these two sets, there are specific preferences. For
example, the preference of c1, P (c1), is an ordered list on the set E ∪ {c1}. It might be of
the following equation(1)
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P (c1) = (ei, ej, . . . , c1, . . . , ek), i, j, k ∈ {1, . . . ,m} (1)
The position of c1 in this ordered list indicates c1’s preference. The elements before c1
in terms of position in the ordered list represent employer whom c1 find attractive, while
those agents whose position in c1’s preference list are behind c1’s represent employers
whom c1 finds less preferable to not working at all. Moreover, the ranking of position
in this preference ranking list indicates preference, for example, candidate #1 prefers job
position provided by employer #i’s to employer #j’s.
Similarly, each employer also has its own preference ranking list. ei has preference
raking list(2) to indicate his preference over all tenants with the same form.
P (ei) = (co, cp, . . . ei, . . . , cq)o, p, q ∈ {1, n} (2)
For employer #ei, he would focus on the people whose position in his preference rank-
ing list are ahead of his, because for those whose positions in the list are behind his indicate.
Candidates who are in the top of the preference ranking list are the preferential choices of
employer #ei.
For candidates, when they find an appropriate job position, it is like matching them
to the appropriate employer. For employers, when they find an appropriate candidate, it
means that they agree to match to the candidate. The temporary labor market includes a set
of candidates, a set of employers and their preference ranking lists.
In the context of markets, employers try to find prospective candidates to fill their job
positions according to their own preference, while the candidates also try to find appropriate
place to work based on their preference. Our goal is to improve the efficiency on establish-
ing a stable matching between candidates and employers based on their own preferences
and requirements.
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4.2.2 Matching in Temporary Labor Market
A matching µ is a one to one correspondence from set E ∪ C onto itself of order two such
that if µ(ei) ̸= ei, then µ(ei) ∈ C; if µ(ci) ̸= ci, then µ(ci) ∈ E. We can notice that
so-called matching includes several pairs that consist of two elements coming from the set
of employers and from the set of candidates. Moreover, two following conditions constrain
the matching. That is, if one of the two elements comes from either the set of employers or
the set of candidates, then the other only comes from the opposite set. [2]
The agents (employers or candidates) have their own preference ranking list, the posi-
tion of the ordered list indicates the agent’s preference. For example, if ci is before cj in








Also indicating that tenant ck prefer landlord ei to landlord ej .
4.2.3 Criteria for Stable Match
Agents from one of two sets find appropriate agents from the opposite set, which actually
is a strategy to match to the preferential agent according to their own preference lists.
Therefore, the existing pair of employers and candidates may be broken up because more
attractive agents come to contact them. More specifically, the existing pair is to be broken
up because of two kinds of situations.
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Blocked By Individual
From the agent’s preference ranking list, we can find some agents from opposite side whose
position in its preference ranking list is behind the place of itself in the list. For example,




Therefore, at the beginning, if we assign ei to cj , the match will be broken up; the pair
is blocked by individual employer cj . If a matching includes such a pair, it means this
matching can be improved by assigning other matches to employer ei, we can save time by
omitting the matches that contains such pairs blocked by an individual. [2]
Blocked By Pair
Another situation would also lead to the existing pairs to be broken up. Assume there
exists a pair of employer ei and candidate ci. In this matching, there also exists another pair
employer ej , candidate cj . But, according to the preferences of everyone, we find ei prefers




i and ei > c
ej
j (6)
In this situation, this matching can be improved by breaking the previous two pair in
order to match cj to ei, because original matching is blocked by those pairs.
If a matching is not in both above two situations, we can notice that the current matching
is a stable matching. We recommend stable matching for the each member of temporary
labor market, as a result, an agent would be satisfied with their partner. This agent could
not be matched with another preferential one, because there exists other agent from same
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set who can replace it. [2]
4.2.4 Criteria for Optimal Match
Optimal matching is a special case of stable matching, we can get a number of stable
matches via the above definition and constraint. The candidate-optimal matching is picking
up one stable matches among all stable matching. In the candidate-optimal matching µ
each candidate has a partner at least not worse than that provided from any other matching
γ (7) [2]
∀c ∈ C, µ(c) > cγ(c) (7)
4.2.5 Deferred Acceptance Algorithm
Gale and Shapley [9] propose the so-called deferred acceptance algorithm, while trying to
achieve an optimal matching. Assume that we want to find the candidate-optimal matching.
According to the above optimal matching definition, for each candidate, we can intuitively
assign their best choice according to their preference ranking list. As a result, some em-
ployers might receive requests from these candidates. The employers who receive requests
can choose to hold them temporarily or release them. But these employers who received
requests can only hold one request. The two operations are run repeatedly until all the
candidates reach an agreement or one of them uses up their preference choices. This kind
of strategy can let all candidates choose the best job position from those offered by the
employers who are willing to accept their request. Accordingly, such an algorithm is di-
vided into two operations: the first operation is a preference-based request sending from
one side to the other side, while the second step is decision-making. As a result, assuming
the candidates side is the side that sends a request to the employers’ side, a candidate can
match with employer to whom they preferred and this employer also agree to accept the
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candidate.
In operation 1, each candidate sends one request to his favorite employer according to
his preference. As a result, in the side of the employers, some employer may receive one or
more requests from various potential candidates, while some employers may face the fact
that no one sent the request to them. It means that they are not the first choice of any one
of the candidates.
In operation 2, for each employer, when all of candidates end up sending operations, it
means employers can decide on the requests they received. For those who receive nothing,
they need to do nothing; for those who only receive one request, they can holding this re-
quest temporarily; for those who receive two or more requests, they need to make a decision
on hold only one of them and at the same time releasing the rest. After all employers who
receive two or more requests end up with decision-making, the released rejected candidates
are free to send the request again to their preferred position as second choice.
The whole algorithm may run several rounds which involve alternating operations of
sending-request and decision-making until all candidates match to corresponding positions
or some non-matching candidates have already use up all of their choices. The flow chart
of the proposed deferred acceptance algorithm is in Figure 4
The corresponding notations and functions are shown in Table 11
And the pseudo-code of the deferred acceptance algorithm proposed by Gale is shown
in algorithm 2
1. At line 1-5, for each candidate, sends a request to their preferred employer in its
preference set P (ti), then taking off this employer from current preference list, next,
adds current candidate into the employer’s received list, which means this employer
has received a request from current candidate.
2. At line 6-15, all candidates have already sent requests to their favorite employer. For
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Figure 4: Deferred acceptance algorithm flow chart
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REk Employer ei’s list for request received from candidates
Pair_ei It is a candidate matched to employer ei
H_ci Candidate ci status on if it is chosen
P (ci) Candidate ci’s preference ranking list
P (ei) Employer ei’s preference ranking list
Send(P (ti)) Select favorite employer for candidate ci and send request to the em-
ployer
P (C) All candidates’ preferences over all all employers
P (E) All employers’ preferences over all candidates
Ms(C,E) stable matching contains key-pairs in which candidate in key set,
employer in value set
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Input: P (C), P (E)
Output: Ms(C,E) stable matching
1 for ∀cj ∈ C do
2 ek = send(P (ci)) ;
3 P (ci) delete ek ;
4 REk ← ci ;
5 end
6 for ∀ej ∈ L do
7 for ∀ci ∈ REi do
8 if ei prefer ci to others then
9 H_ci is true ;
10 Pair_ei = ti ;
11 end
12 else




17 while P (ti) is null || all H_ci are true do
18 for ∀ci ∈ T do




23 ek = send(P (ci)) ;
24 P (ti) delete ek ;
25 REk ← ti
26 end
27 end
28 for ∀ej ∈ E do
29 for ∀ci ∈ REi do
30 if ei prefer ci to others then
31 H_ci is true ;










Algorithm 1: Pseudo algorithm for the proposed deferred acceptance algorithm
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each employer, selects its favorite candidate’s request among all requests it received,
and marks this candidate as true as well as the rest as false, which means it decides
to hold that true candidate temporarily and reject the rest.
3. At line 16-35, the first round of operations has terminated. Moves to next round
after judging the condition. When one candidate’s preference ranking list is null,
indicating all employers rejected him, therefore he has no employer to choose and
send request. Operation ending up with current matching that is final result. If all
candidates are held, the stable match is generated. Otherwise, we only need to fo-
cus on the rejected candidates. For those rejected candidates, because his previously
selected employer has already been deleted from his preference ranking list, he se-
lects his favorite employer based on revised preference raking list. After all rejected
candidates finishing sending requests, it is the employer’s turn to make decision to
continue to hold current candidate or replace it via the new candidate from new re-
ceived requests.
4.3 Request-Accumulated Deferred Acceptance Algorithm
4.3.1 Analysis on Deferred Acceptance Algorithm
The first operation of the deferred acceptance algorithm is to define which side of two sides
as sender side, while the other side is automatically the receiver side. The result is sender
optimal stable matching. In our paper, we define the candidate in temporary labor market
as the sender side, and employer side as the receiver side. After making sure which side
is sender or receiver, the algorithm will recursively run two operations, “sending request"
and “making decision". Sender side first sends requests to their current best choice, and
then removes the choice from their preference list, meaning it has no chance to resend the
request to the same object again. And because of this, if the employer (request receiver)
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declines it, the candidate has no choice but to send request to its next choice that is currently
its best choice after it removes last employer from the preference list.
Therefore, the reason why this algorithm can find an Request accumulated matching
is because sender side (candidates side) has chances to match to their best choice, and
they will match to their best choice among all receivers (employers) who are also willing
to match to them. Besides, receiver sides can only match to their best choice among all
senders who already sent requests. The resulting match is stable match, because for any
pair of candidate and employer in the stable match, the candidate in this pair can not find
another receiver who not only receives request from the sender of the pair, but also likes to
accept this request.
In summary, on one hand, senders (candidates side)in the market constantly send re-
quests and adjust their preference list until the preference list is empty or the stable match-
ing is generated. On the other hand, the receiver (employers side) constantly makes de-
cisions on holding requests. They can only hold one request, which means they need to
reevaluate the requests they receive according to their own preference list. For each round,
free candidates come from the candidates who were rejected. Only rejected senders can
send new requests again. But in the deferred acceptance algorithm, rejected senders can
only do the operation after all of receivers have finished their decision making.
Through the analysis of the above algorithm, we can notice that the most time consum-
ing part is the recursive execution of operations, including “sending request" by senders and
“decision making" by receivers. In the same context , the result, sender (candidates side)
optimal stable matching stays the same, which means total time of execution of “sending
request" remains the same. For each sender, they will take fixed times of execution of oper-
ation “sending" no matter how many times they run the algorithm to obtain sender optimal
stable matching. Only if the preferences stay the same, the “sending request" operation will
be executed a fixed number of times. However, even if we can not decrease the number of
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times of execution of “sending" for identical preferences from senders and receivers, we
still can optimize the amount of times of execution of operation “decision making". If,
in the market, sender s1 is at last matched to receiver r1 in the result of sender optimal
stable matching, then the best way to optimize the execution times of operation “decision
making" is let the s1 send request to r1 as soon as possible. We will validate this later.
4.3.2 Improving in Algorithm
Based on the idea above, I propose an request-accumulated algorithm based on the deferred
acceptance algorithm. The following is its algorithm flow chart in Figure 5. The pseudo-
code of the RADA algorithm is in algorithm 2
Input: P (S), P (R)
Output: Stable(S,R) stable matching
1 while ∀s ∈ S do
2 r ← sending(s, S);
3 Stable(S,R)← {s, r};
4 end
5 while ∀r has more than one request do




10 for ∀{s, r} ∈ Stable(S,R) do
11 s← deciding(r, R, Stable(S,R));
12 Rejected_Set← s;
13 end
14 for ∀s ∈ Rejected_Set do




Algorithm 2: Pseudo algorithm for the RADA algorithm
This main purpose of it is to let the sender side (candidates side) send requests more
quickly, decreasing the number of times of execution of “decision making"
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Figure 5: Request-accumulated deferred acceptance algorithm flow chart
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4.3.3 Theorem for Stable Match
The RADA algorithm mentioned above can save more time in running, but I also need
to proof that it can still generate the same result as classical algorithm do. In Gale and
Shapley’s paper, we can find that they had already proof some theorems using marriage
market.
Theorem 1. There is at least one stable matching for every marriage market. [2]
Proof. Round 1: At begin, each agent from sender side send request to his best choice.
Then each agent from receiver side hold one request and reject the rest.
Round K: All rejected at round k-1 agents from sender side send a new request to his
best choice who hasn’t yet rejected him. Then each agent from receiver side hold one
request and reject the rest.
Stop condition: When one agent from sender side has been rejected by all receiver
agents, or all sender side agents has been held by opposite side ones simultaneously.
We can notice that the algorithm terminates, because agents from sender side can not
send the request to the same receiver side agent twice. The matching generated via this
way is stable. It is not blocked by individual, because the sender would send the request to
the acceptable receiver, and the receiver would hold the request from the acceptable sender.
Besides, it is not blocked by pair, because if some sender would prefer to a receiver than his
assigned in current match, he must have already proposed to this receiver, and this receiver
has rejected him, which means this receiver prefer other sender than him.
This proof proves that the deferred acceptance algorithm can generate a stable match.
We can also prove that our RADA algorithm can also generate a stable match.
Theorem 2. The RADA algorithm can generate a stable match.
Proof. Initially, there is a circular linked list containing n receivers.
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Step 1: At the beginning, each agent from the sender side sends a request to their best
choice. The first agent from the receiver side makes a decision, holding one request while
rejecting the rest.
Step K: Each sender sends a request to their best choice according to the receiver side
decision from step K-1. The receiver following the receiver in step K-1, makes a decision
based on all requests he holds currently, holding one request from one sender, and rejecting
the rest.
Stop condition: Stop condition: When one agent from sender side has been rejected by
all receiver agents, or all sender side agents has been held by opposite side ones simultane-
ously.
Based on the analysis above in Theorem 1, we can find the RADA algorithm still insists
two rules. We assume all the receiver participate the algorithm is acceptable for all senders,
which prevent the match from being blocked by individual. Sender sends its request as the
sequence of its preference. It prevents the match from being blocked by pair.
Through the proof, we can assure that it can also generate a stable matching like the
classical algorithm. But it seems not appropriate to move this algorithm to temporary labor
market. In the next chapter, I introduce the dynamic market to make it more suitable for
the situation of temporary labor market.
4.4 Summary
In this chapter, I mainly introduced related materials with classical two-sided matching
algorithm. Through this part, We can find that the classical two-sided matching algorithm
was designed mainly for finding stable matching for a static market. It means the whole
market cannot be changed while the algorithm is running to generate the results. However,
we are facing a problem happen in such a market where the members constantly change
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over time. We cannot guarantee the basic assumption for dynamic market so that this
algorithm is not suitable for our problem where happen in the dynamic market. In the





In this chapter, I propose two dynamic algorithms to solve the problem happen in the cir-
cumstance of dynamic market. I introduce the dynamic market and its differences to the
static market. In a word, the dynamic market has more variability, comparing to the static
market where it does not need to think over the situation of the market’s changes happen.
Then, I introduce two kinds of algorithms respectively, each of them can solve the prob-
lem, leading to a stable match. However, given the consistency of the stable match, the
second algorithm, namely repair-based algorithm can lead to higher consistency of the re-
sult. Higher consistency of the result can lead to higher customer satisfaction, because less
of the customer may be affected by the market’s changes.
5.2 Dynamic in Temporary Labor Market
As we mentioned before, the temporary labor market is facing more variability in the mem-
bers participating in market. The basic feature of two-sided matching is to try to match ele-
ments in two disjoints sets with each other. In the context of marriage problem, the number
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of men and women remains relatively constant, compared to the temporary labor market.
People in the marriage market do not have tendency to join or leave the market constantly
in a short period of time. Things change when moving to the temporary labor market. In
this context, new candidates and employers may join or leave market constantly with more
possibility. Also, the stable concept is a relative one, which relies on the stability of the
market. When a member of the market changes, the stability of the market will be inter-
rupted. Existing two-sided matching models usually require stable agent population and
their preferences, which is usually unattainable in large online markets. Dynamic changes
are an essential characteristic of large online markets. The population of the agents, their
status and preferences may change over time. There are continuously new members joining
the market and members withdrawing from the market. Even the preferences of members
are fine-tuned. The static market we talked before is static in a short period of time but it
also can be treated as a dynamical market in long period of time. The market changes with
time. Resulting to changes in the market context, leading to destabilizing of the previous
stable match. In the following, it could discuss some possible changes happening in the
temporary labor market.
5.2.1 New Agents Entering Market
Different from classical two-sided matching models, in continuous two-sided markets stud-
ied in this paper, there will be no fixed time frame restrictions on when the agents (providers
or customers) have to enter into the market and when the market has to be cleared. New
agents can join the market at any time, which will affect the stability of the existing match-
ing. A new stable matching needs to be computed to regain the stability of the market.
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5.2.2 Existing Agents Withdraw From Market
Both existing providers and customers can withdraw from the market at any time. However,
a provider needs to reject the proposal she is holding before withdrawing. If she does not
hold any proposal, she can withdraw freely. In the same way, if a customer is held by a
provider, she can withdraw freely. However, if she is held by a provider, she will not be
allowed to make a new proposal to another provider.
5.2.3 Preference Changes
Agents’ preferences may change during the matching process. These type of changes are
usually small. They could be a preference fine-tuning resulting from additional informa-
tion obtained by the agents along the process of matching. However, in theory, preference
changes will also affect the stability of the matching even though the changes are not dras-
tic.
There can be a fourth dynamic change to the market: agents leave the market with
agreements. If a provider is satisfied with the customer she is holding and does not want
to wait any longer, she can accept the proposal of the customer. In this case, we say the
provider and customer have reached an agreement. These agents will leave the market
with a successful matching. Since we suppose that a stable matching has been generated,
agents are already paired to each other meaning that there are no any two unpaired agents
from each side of the market willing to break their current matching and be paired together.
In this case, if two paired agents reach the agreement and leave the market, this event
will not provide any more options for the remaining pairs. Therefore, the remaining pairs
will not deviate from the remaining matching, in other words, the matching is still stable.
Therefore, the leaving of successfully matched pairs will not affect the stability of the
market. I believe that occasion happen when intermediary agency exists, because in this
situation, two sided agents have no idea about the information on whether others agents join
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or leave. The demand of matching is conducted by the “sending request" side. We define
the market which has no intermediary agency involved as the centralized dynamical market.
Similarly,the de-centralized dynamical market refers to one where there is intermediary
agency.
5.3 Re-matching-Based Algorithm
5.3.1 Fixed Time Interval in Re-matching
As we know, The notion of stable matching was derived from static market settings. It
is a relative one, which means, after a stable matching is reached, a market change could
break the stability of the existing matching. In the setting of dynamic markets, we define
stable matching as a time-related concept. When we say a matching is stable we mean
the matching is stable at a particular time given the population of the agents and their
preferences at that time. When the market is static, the agents who join the market stay
the same, as a result, the market preferences sets still remains the same, a stable matching
can be obtained via Gale and Shapley’s algorithm. However, when we thought over the
dynamical market from the de-centralized aspect, we can extend the Gale and Shapley’s
algorithm to meet for the changes. In the following section, we propose algorithms for
obtaining time-related stable matching through re-matching
Notice that the dynamic market with respect to time. We can assume that there are
several nodes in the time horizon where the market keeps static in any time interval between
any two adjacent nodes. All modification occurs on the endpoint of a period of time.
This assumption simulates the realistic occasion. Based on this assumption, we can re-run
Gale and Shapley’s algorithm at each endpoint of a unit of time to obtain a revised stable
matching after changes occur in the context of two-sided matching market. We just assume
the duration of the period of time is fixed to get close to the realistic situation. Based on
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this, we propose a revised algorithm, and the flowchart is in Figure 6
The corresponding notations and functions are shown in Table 12






Cava Available candidates set
Eava Available employers set
Adjust() Adjust preferences based on current available member
Availed(ci) Judge candidate ci that whether it is available for matching
And the pseudo-code of the revised preference algorithm based on the fixed time inter-
val is in algorithm 3
1. At line 1-5, for each candidate in the previous matching, judge its availability, if it is
available for next matching operation, put it into available candidate set.
2. At line 6-8, for each candidate in new joined candidates set, put it into available
candidate set.
3. At line 9-13, for each employer in previous matching, judge its availability, if it is
available for next matching operation, put it into available employer set.
4. At line 14-16, for each employer in new joining employer set, put it into available
employer set.
5. At line 17 generate new preference set based on current available members in market
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Figure 6: A revised algorithm based on the fixed time interval
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Input: new candidatesCn, new employersEm
Output: market preference set
1 for ∀cj ∈ C do




6 for ∀ci ∈ Cn do
7 Cava.add(cj);
8 end
9 for ∀ej ∈ E do




14 for ∀ei ∈ Em do
15 Eava.add(ei);
16 end
17 (P (Cava), P (Eava)) = adjust(Cava, Eava);
Algorithm 3: Pseudo algorithm for the revised preference algorithm based on the
fixed time interval
After we obtained the revised preferences set via the above algorithm, we can call the
Gale and Shapley algorithm to get new revised stable matching based on new context of
market.
5.3.2 Flexible Time Interval in Re-matching
The previous algorithm simulates realistic situations approximately, as it assumes changes
happen just on endpoints of a period of time, while changes may occurs at any time. Facing
this assumption, we need to relax the restriction by changing the fixed time interval into the
flexible time interval. The accuracy of the result affected by the restriction get the better if
the time interval gets smaller. In the flexible time interval, the algorithm will be executed
to generate revised stable matching when new changes occur. Its flow chart is in Figure 7
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Figure 7: A revised algorithm based on flexible time interval
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This algorithm from the flexible time interval aspect is similar to the previous one, the
unique difference is the frequency of re-running Gale and Shapley’s deferred acceptance
algorithm to obtain a new stable matching when some changes occurs in the market lead-
ing to the original stable matching becoming unstable. We discuss the re-matching-based
algorithm which makes use of the deferred acceptance algorithm periodically for dynamic
market. Imagine that at the beginning, based on the current market, we can generate a
stable matching. When detecting new changes, employers need to decide whether they
want to accept the holding candidate. For those that decide to reach the agreement with
their holding customers, both the providers and their customers will leave the market with
agreements. Therefore they are unavailable for future rounds. Employers can, of cause,
reject the holding candidate and withdraw from the market. In this situation, the candi-
date becomes a rejected one, and they need to decide whether they remain in the market
for next round of matching. If they decide to leave, then they are unavailable and need to
be remove from the market member set. At the end of each time interval, the remaining
agents and newly entered agents form an updated market. At the beginning of the next
interval, the agents in the new market will rematch according to the deferred acceptance
algorithm, based on the updated agent population and preferences. The length of the in-
terval can be adjusted to reflect the designer’s preference over the responsiveness of the
market to dynamic changes. An extreme case is that the deferred acceptance algorithm is
rerun whenever a change occurs. In general, this re-matching-based algorithm does not
obtain time-related stable matching in a real-time manner. However, it can approximate the




The re-matching-based algorithm can approximate time-related stable matching. However,
since it recalculates the whole process from beginning of each interval, the revised stable
matching result is not a derived one based on the previous one. As a result, the re-matching-
based algorithm could not generate a stable matching and also remain the consistency be-
tween the previous matching and the revised matching. In my opinion result consistency
also plays an important role in evaluating the result besides its stability. For example, a sta-
ble matching with high consistency can interfere with less agents, otherwise, those agents
may think the recommendation from the agency is volatile, which would affect their con-
fidence for said agency. To measure it, we bring the notion of consistency to our model.
Consistency can be measured by the difference between the current stable matching with
the last stable matching. The reason that we should think about this is that high levels of
consistency can improve customer satisfaction, because we can help them save time instead
of beginning another contract with a new agent. High level of consistency ensures that the
original agent’s matching can be distributed as little as possible. But the disturbing due to
the changes in the market can not be stopped completely. The new changes which occur in
the market leads to changes in stable matching which can be treated as disturbing for orig-
inal matching. The fewer members who change their matches, thus affecting the market,
the more satisfied the customers will be due to a high degree of consistency. The following





Where num_onverlapped_pairs is the number of same pairs between the original mar-
ket and the revised market; the num_pairs_updated_market is the number of pairs of the
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revised market after changes occurs.
5.4.2 Improving Result Consistency
It is unrealistic to rerun the algorithm constantly, because we need to think about such as the
fact that while sometimes candidates and employers were pairs in the last stable matching,
they have not made the decision to sign a contract and are still available. At that time,
we need to make such pairs as consistent as possible. The improved way is to repair the
unstable part after the preferences change rather than rerun the whole operation to obtain a
new stable matching.
When the temporary labor market changes, the previous stable matching becomes un-
stable. It is critical to adjust the available members in the market and modify their cor-
responding preferences. After that, we can find which candidates need to execute the op-
eration of “sending request" by analyzing previous stable matching structure instead of
breaking up the original pair and force them to re-execute “sending request". It is obvious
that there exists several pair candidates and employers who are still available for the next
matching. At the same time, some agents (candidates or employers) may not be available
and are going to be deleted from the available list. Besides, some new agents are going
to join in the market; therefore, they will be added into available list. To repair this un-
stable matching, it is easy to divide all candidates into two parts, candidates from one part
are already in pair with some employers, they are stable pairs from the previous matching.
One thing we know is that the match, which consists of these pairs, is not stable, but close
to. This is due to the fact that these pairs may not change, even if a new stable matching
is generated by the re-matching algorithm. I think this part of candidates is held by cor-
responding landlord temporarily. The other part of the candidates, they are broken up and
single. As the result, these parts of candidates are what we need to focus on. It can save
more time to allow part of the candidates to send requests rather than allow all of them to
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do so. Repairing unstable matching does not involving the operation again but to do the
smallest possible operations.
5.4.3 De-centralized Dynamical Market
I propose a repair-based algorithm to calculate a new stable matching to meet for the dy-
namic changes occur in market. The algorithm will start repairing a disrupted stable match-
ing whenever a dynamic change occurs. In this case, employers may have the tendency to
hold the request from candidates side until receive better one. To be fair to the candidates,
as a market rule, it is reasonable to request that the receiver side(employers) is obligated to
either accept or reject its holding request from sender side(candidates). Since candidates
held by employers are obligated to be paired with the holding employer if the employer
accepts the request, in the algorithm design, we only allow rejected and newly entered can-
didates to initiate a proposal. The reason for this is because we assume there is intermediate
agency in the market, which we called it “de-centralized dynamical market". In this kind
of market, only the sender side’s requirement drive the execution of “sending request".
We would discuss the difference between de-centralized dynamical market and centralized
dynamical market in the latter part.
For the purpose of easy representation, without losing generality, we assume a discrete
time line consists of small time intervals. The size of the interval can be as small as the
designer wishes to capture real-time dynamic changes. Suppose that a set of dynamic
changes occur at time interval k. We define Sk−1 as the matching solution at interval k-1,
New_ek as the set of providers entered into the market at interval k and New_ck as the set
of candidates entered into the market at interval k. All employers without an agreement at
k-1 is denoted as NoA_ek−1; all candidates rejected at k-1 is denoted as Rejected_tk−1.
Candidates are not held by employers are called free candidates, denoted as Free_ck. For
a candidate c, if a employer has never rejected it, the employer belongs to the available
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employers set of candidate c, denoted as Avai_ekc . At each iteration of matching, holding_-
ce stores the most preferred proposal that is held by the employer l.
The flowchart Figure 8 show us how to adjust the changes of agents in the market.
After that we use repair-based algorithmFigure 9 recursively to generate a revised stable
matching with higher result consistency.
Figure 8: Repair-based algorithm flow chart 1
The flowing explanation can help explain the algorithm.
1. Line 1 is initialization, it can obtain those still available agent in interval k
2. Line 2 - 7: Adjusting available agents set by union added agents in interval k
3. Line 3: Obtaining the rejected candidates in interval k-1
4. Line 7: Free candidates on interval k
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Figure 9: Repair-based algorithm flow chart 2
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Input: new candidatesNew_ck, new employersNew_ek, Sk−1
Output: Sk
1 NoA_ek−1 = getNoAgreementProviders(Sk−1);
2 NoA_ek = NoA_ek−1 ∪New_ek;
3 Rejected_ck−1 = getRejectedcustomers(Sk−1);
4 for ∀c ∈ NoA_ck−1 do
5 holdingtl = getHoldingCustomer(c, S
k−1);
6 end
7 Free_ck = Rejectedk−1c ∪New_ck
8 for ∀c ∈ Free_ek do
9 Ava_ekc = NoA_e
k;
10 end
11 while Free_ck = ∅orAvai_ekc = ∅for∀c ∈ Freekc do
12 for ∀c ∈ Free_ck do
13 update(Prefer(t));
14 find_most_prefered(Prefer(c), Avai_ckt );
15 send request to most preferred e;
16 for ∀e ∈ NoAke do
17 Received_ce ←− {receivedrequests} ∪ holding_ce;
18 update(Preferencee);
19 if Received_ce ̸= ∅ then
20 find_most_prefered(Prefer(e), Received_ce);
21 holding_ce = mostpreferedc;
22 for ∀c ∈ Received_ce − holding_ce do
23 remove e from Avai_ekt ;






30 ReturnSk = {(e, holding_ce)|e ∈ NoAke};
Algorithm 4: Pseudo algorithm for the repair-based algorithm
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5. Line 8-10: Initializing available employers for free candidates
6. Line 11-29: Iterative matching repairing
5.4.4 Centralized Dynamical Market
It is necessary to mention that the repair-based de-centralized dynamic matching algorithm
does not accommodate preference changes from candidates’ side. Once a candidate has
submitted a proposal to a provider and the proposal is on hold (not rejected), the candidate is
not free anymore. They cannot withdraw their proposal even their preference has changed.
I made this assumption due to the fact that I think when there has intermediate agency in
market, agency will not let the original stable pair break to contact with the new joined
employers. The operation of “sending request" is conducted by free candidates. In special
cases, only one candidate joins the de-centralized dynamic market will lead to the original
stable matching breaking, because there is no free candidate existing in current market.
However, things may change when it is conducted in centralized dynamic market. The
centralized dynamic market refers to no intermediate agency present in the market. It means
that the candidate side knows which new agents joined the other side, which is different
from the mechanism in de-centralized dynamic market. The candidates side does not know
the occasions of participation in de-centralized dynamical market where only intermediate
agency understands these occasions from both two sides. Because of this, even only if one
employer joins the market,some original stable pair still encounter the possibility to break
up pair for the new employer, when the candidate prefers the new employer to the one
assigned to it on the previous time interval by algorithm.
Therefore, the basic idea to adjust the free candidate list, when the preferences modifi-
cation is finished. The adjustment process needs to make a judgment to see if the candidate
prefers the new employers to its current partner. As a result, we can summarize that there
are following ways to lead free candidates appear.
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1. New candidate join into our market;
2. Existing employers in stable pair of previous stable matching leave our market;
3. New employers join into our market so that some candidate in one stable pair even
prefer to them.
Based on above, I propose another algorithm to carter for this kinds of situation. The
algorithm flow chart is in Figure 10Figure 11Figure 12
Figure 10: Repair-based algorithm flow chart for centralized dynamical market 1
In the centralized dynamic market, the issue we face is that any change occurring in the
market also leads to the original stable matching breaking up. As we discuss before, if the
dynamic market has the third part who plays a role as the intermediate agency, which means
neither one of two sides does not know the changes of opposite side agents. At that time,
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Figure 11: Repair-based algorithm flow chart for centralized dynamical market 2
62
Figure 12: Repair-based algorithm flow chart for centralized dynamical market 3
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the participation happen on employers side (requests receiver) does not lead to the original
stable matching breaking up. However, in the centralized dynamic market, namely, there
is not intermediate agency in it. As a result, we add the operation that compares current
matching agents of candidates (request sender side) to new joined employers (request re-
ceiver side). If some candidate prefers one new employer to its current matching agent, the
pair also needs to be broken up, to let the candidate have a chance to send the request to the
new employer. This is different from the operation in de-centralized dynamical market.
5.4.5 Theorem
Theorem 3. Given that a stable matching has been generated for a market, the repair-
based matching algorithm is able to compute a new stable matching when new agents
enter into the market, existing agents withdraw from the market and providers change their
preferences.
Proof. The theorem is proven under the following two cases:
Case#1: New agents enter the market and existing agents leave the market. In this
case, the algorithm updates the set of all providers without an agreement, NoA_ekand
free customers who are not held by providers, Free_ekSince the algorithm only allows
free customers to initiate proposals, and the iterative matching module of the algorithm
resembles the deferred acceptance algorithm, when the algorithm terminates, that is the
set of free customers is empty or the set of available providers for any free customers is
empty, there will be no more new proposals to be made. Therefore, the resulting matching
is stable.
Case #2: Providers change their preferences. In the iterative repairing module of the al-
gorithm, during each iteration, all providers have the opportunity to re-evaluate their current
holding candidate and newly received customer proposals. Should an employer’s prefer-
ence change during any iteration, they can reject the current holding customer and switch
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to a new one. After the switch, the rejected customer will be equivalent to a newly en-
tered customer and go through the procedure described in Case#1 to find another provider.
Therefore the process will terminate with a stable matching.
5.5 Summary
In this chapter, I use two kinds of dynamic algorithms to solve the dynamic problem re-
sulting from the dynamic market. One of them is more straightforward to propose. It is
simple to keep repeating the same operation of the deferred acceptance algorithm. When
some changes happen in the market. I called this method the re-matching algorithm that
can react to generate a new stable match after some changes happen in the market. But it
has an obvious shortcoming that those customers keep receiving some different recommen-
dations from the system. These recommendations, since they may change over time, can be
a disturbance to customers. This is due to the fact that some others’ behavior may change
the status of the current market, causing the original stable match to become unstable. The
system repeatedly runs the algorithm to generate a new stable match and informs all of the
customers. In such a circumstance, a large part of customers may be disturbed by the rec-
ommendations as a new stable match is generated. This, in turn, may affect the customers’
satisfaction. Therefore, based on the re-matching-based algorithm, I propose the repair-
based algorithm to try to increase the consistency of the stable match. This algorithm aims
to further improve the customer satisfaction.
Next, we tackle to evaluate the effectiveness of the algorithms, by conducting some





In this chapter, I first aim to compare the deferred acceptance algorithm with the request-
accumulated deferred acceptance algorithm in terms of the running time and the number
of times operations are executed. I then want to compare the re-matching-based algorithm
with the repair-based algorithm in terms of the consistency of the result. Finally, I mention
the best result consistency when I specified a concrete situation where We can find the
result consistency in the repair-based algorithm is also close to the best situation in the
same circumstance.
6.2 Deferred Acceptance Algorithm andRADAAlgorithm
The RADA algorithm is employed to minimize the execution time of the algorithm. The
advantage of this algorithm is that it can minimize the number of times of execution for the
operation “decision making" without increasing the times of operation “sending request".




Assuming we have a marriage market, with 10 men and 10 women. For the sake of sim-
plicity, we set the number of men and women equal to each other. Their preferences are in
Table 13
Table 13: Preferences for 10 * 10 marriage model
Women ID Woman Preferences Men ID Man Preferences
0 [8, 6, 7, 4, 2, 0, 9, 3, 1, 5] 0 [3, 4, 2, 6, 0, 7, 1, 8, 9, 5]
1 [5, 9, 2, 3, 4, 0, 7, 1, 8, 6] 1 [6, 4, 9, 2, 8, 3, 0, 5, 1, 7]
2 [2, 4, 0, 5, 3, 6, 8, 7, 1, 9] 2 [8, 3, 9, 6, 2, 4, 7, 0, 5, 1]
3 [8, 1, 9, 5, 6, 7, 3, 0, 4, 2] 3 [9, 3, 1, 2, 0, 8, 7, 5, 6, 4]
4 [1, 3, 8, 4, 7, 0, 2, 6, 5, 9] 4 [5, 9, 0, 1, 3, 2, 8, 7, 4, 6]
5 [3, 5, 2, 4, 9, 6, 7, 1, 8, 0] 5 [0, 8, 7, 4, 9, 2, 3, 1, 5, 6]
6 [2, 4, 6, 0, 1, 7, 9, 5, 3, 8] 6 [4, 6, 1, 7, 9, 2, 0, 5, 8, 3]
7 [4, 9, 5, 0, 7, 1, 8, 2, 3, 6] 7 [1, 4, 7, 8, 3, 5, 6, 9, 0, 2]
8 [5, 3, 7, 1, 2, 4, 8, 0, 9, 6] 8 [7, 0, 1, 6, 5, 2, 9, 8, 3, 4]
9 [5, 4, 9, 6, 0, 7, 3, 1, 8, 2] 9 [3, 2, 7, 1, 9, 6, 4, 8, 5, 0]
We run the deferred acceptance algorithm 10 times to obtain the average time of exe-
cution. The man-sided optimal stable matching for running the algorithm ten times is in
Table 14
Table 14: 10 * 10 Man optimal stable matching
Woman ID 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Man ID 5 7 0 9 1 4 6 8 2 3
The executing time for 10 times running of the algorithm is in Table 15
And then, we use the request-accumulated deferred acceptance algorithm to work with
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Table 15: Running time for 10 * 10 Man optimal stable matching
Time (Milliseconds) 1.23 1.23 1.21 1.19 1.19 1.24 1.21 1.25 2.25 1.19
the same preferences in Table 13, and find that the result is the same, which because the
request-accumulated deferred acceptance algorithm also can obtain male optimal stable
matching, and the male optimal stable matching the unique for the same set of preferences.
We also record the running time below.
Table 16: Request-accumulated algorithm running time for 10 * 10 Man optimal stable
matching
Time (Milliseconds) 1.33 1.61 1.45 1.42 1.19 1.38 1.21 1.34 1.46 1.37
We can notice that the average running time for the request-accumulated deferred ac-
ceptance algorithm is 1.376 milliseconds while the one for deferred acceptance algorithm
is 1.319 milliseconds. The running times are similar to each other. At the same time, the
variance for RADA algorithm results is 0.32 and the variance for the normal algorithm is
0.12. It means the RADA algorithm has more stability.
In addition to this, we count the times operations are executed, specially “sending re-
quest" and “decision making". The result is that the normal deferred acceptance algorithm
executes the operation “sending request" 14 times, and “decision making" 50 times, while
the RADA algorithm runs the same number of times on the operation “sending request" but
only 4 times on the “decision making". Due to this, I infer that when the size gets bigger,
the running time should be less via the RADA algorithm.
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6.2.2 Experiment 2
We randomly expand the size the set of men and the set of women, n =30, 40, 50, 60. The
corresponding preferences are in Table 17
The 30 * 30 male-sided optimal stable matching is in Table 21 and the contradistinction
of two algorithms in terms of running time is in Table 22. From Table 22, we can notice that
the average running time for the deferred acceptance algorithm is 52.61 milliseconds with
stand deviation of 6.22, while the RADA algorithm’s running time is 8.45 milliseconds
with standard deviation of 1.01. The reason for this is that we need to execute “sending
request" operation 45 times and “decision making" operation up to 2790 times via deferred
acceptance algorithm, while the other algorithm executes “sending request" operation up
to 45 times, too, but “decision making" operation only 111 times.
The 40 * 40 man optimal stable matching result is in Table 23 and the contradistinction
of two algorithms in terms of running time is in Table 24. We can notice that the average
running time for the deferred acceptance algorithm is 45.02 milliseconds with stand devi-
ation of 5.88, while the RADA algorithm’s running time is 9.03 milliseconds with stand
deviation of 1.01 The reason for this is that we need execute “sending request" operation
for 214 times and “decision making" operation up to 2400 times via deferred acceptance
algorithm, while other algorithm executes “sending request" operation up to 214 times, too,
but “decision making" operation only 157 times.
The running time situations are similar, when size = 50, 60. When size = 50, the
deferred acceptance algorithm averagely need 29.78 milliseconds, 163 times “sending re-
quest" and 1000 times “decision making" to get result, while the other need 5.73 millisec-
onds, 163 times “sending request" and 92 times “decision making" to run. When size =
60, the deferred acceptance algorithm needs, on average, 135.48 milliseconds, 360 times
“sending request" and 7020 times “decision making" to get the result, while the other needs
17.39 milliseconds, 360 times “sending request" and 275 times “decision making" to run.
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Table 17: Preferences for 30 * 30 marriage model
Women ID Woman Preferences Men ID Man Preferences
0 [13, 23, 27, 8, 24, 7, 28, 22,
2, 25, 3, 12, 15, 16, 19, 9, 17,
20, 0, 29, 6, 14, 4, 11, 26, 21,
5, 1, 10, 18]
0 [26, 27, 8, 22, 13, 24, 0, 20,
25, 11, 4, 29, 18, 17, 19, 12,
1, 14, 2, 7, 9, 28, 21, 6, 3, 5,
16, 23, 10, 15]
1 [14, 5, 2, 21, 7, 1, 12, 28, 24,
17, 13, 15, 20, 26, 22, 8, 19,
29, 11, 23, 16, 10, 27, 6, 9,
25, 3, 0, 4, 18]
1 [22, 18, 23, 4, 13, 2, 19, 28,
17, 14, 15, 7, 10, 5, 29, 16,
25, 8, 21, 9, 11, 3, 1, 20, 27,
6, 12, 0, 24, 26]
2 [17, 23, 3, 15, 25, 14, 19, 12,
29, 0, 4, 22, 20, 10, 28, 18, 8,
16, 27, 13, 2, 26, 7, 21, 11, 5,
1, 24, 9, 6]
2 [9, 8, 6, 17, 0, 18, 10, 20, 26,
3, 27, 14, 29, 12, 4, 21, 13,
22, 25, 5, 7, 24, 2, 15, 1, 23,
11, 28, 16, 19]
3 [19, 18, 13, 20, 9, 22, 27, 29,
26, 24, 25, 10, 5, 6, 4, 3, 17,
8, 0, 16, 23, 7, 12, 2, 15, 21,
14, 1, 11, 28]
3 [14, 24, 16, 18, 20, 4, 7, 26,
11, 22, 23, 25, 28, 13, 2, 0, 3,
5, 17, 29, 15, 6, 10, 8, 21, 12,
9, 27, 1, 19]
4 [14, 12, 13, 18, 15, 17, 23,
26, 8, 29, 22, 5, 7, 3, 21, 0, 9,
4, 6, 2, 10, 16, 1, 19, 20, 27,
24, 11, 28, 25]
4 [24, 3, 17, 22, 23, 25, 2, 29,
6, 27, 12, 19, 8, 21, 15, 11,
14, 13, 10, 5, 9, 4, 18, 7, 26,
16, 1, 0, 28, 20]
5 [1, 18, 20, 10, 23, 16, 28, 26,
8, 21, 9, 7, 27, 5, 13, 11, 4,
15, 2, 24, 22, 29, 0, 6, 19, 25,
3, 14, 17, 12]
5 [16, 9, 23, 28, 4, 20, 21, 1,
19, 24, 14, 26, 25, 8, 6, 17, 2,
0, 5, 7, 3, 18, 11, 22, 12, 10,
13, 27, 15, 29]
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
27 [17, 29, 0, 20, 25, 10, 7, 9,
22, 13, 15, 11, 19, 27, 21, 14,
5, 28, 6, 4, 24, 3, 16, 26, 23,
8, 18, 2, 12, 1]
27 [23, 26, 27, 12, 18, 25, 17, 3,
11, 24, 29, 16, 4, 0, 2, 21, 28,
7, 13, 5, 8, 14, 9, 20, 19, 15,
6, 1, 22, 10]
28 [29, 14, 7, 13, 17, 1, 15, 5,
28, 4, 12, 16, 20, 21, 19, 26,
27, 6, 23, 24, 11, 9, 10, 18, 8,
3, 2, 25, 22, 0]
28 [22, 4, 24, 10, 6, 9, 8, 26, 17,
5, 11, 15, 13, 23, 14, 20, 21,
28, 0, 2, 16, 1, 7, 19, 18, 12,
3, 29, 25, 27]
29 [10, 24, 21, 12, 1, 28, 13, 5,
3, 0, 29, 16, 18, 7, 15, 25, 23,
26, 2, 19, 8, 11, 9, 14, 22, 27,
6, 17, 4, 20]
29 [17, 23, 15, 0, 29, 10, 28, 25,
1, 11, 21, 18, 27, 26, 13, 20,
14, 12, 16, 3, 7, 6, 2, 22, 5, 4,
8, 19, 9, 24]
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Table 18: Preferences for 40 * 40 marriage model
Women ID Woman Preferences Men ID Man Preferences
0 [4, 18, 35, 30, 38, 14, 19, 36,
15, 33, 13, 29, 3, 39, 10, 8, 9,
32, 24, 26, 0, 7, 2, 34, 5, 22,
11, 17, 1, 28, 37, 25, 16, 27,
23, 31, 6, 21, 20, 12]
0 [6, 7, 4, 38, 3, 18, 33, 39, 27,
36, 15, 20, 32, 28, 12, 17, 0,
31, 21, 30, 16, 34, 26, 8, 23,
22, 14, 24, 1, 9, 29, 37, 11,
10, 25, 13, 2, 5, 19, 35]
1 [11, 5, 30, 15, 22, 32, 9, 23,
7, 13, 20, 24, 16, 10, 33, 14,
28, 21, 38, 8, 3, 29, 19, 34,
36, 37, 31, 26, 2, 18, 27, 4,
17, 25, 6, 0, 35, 12, 39, 1]
1 [28, 37, 32, 14, 5, 3, 26, 16,
7, 21, 10, 31, 8, 27, 29, 15,
18, 35, 6, 2, 24, 17, 30, 4, 19,
34, 1, 38, 39, 25, 20, 13, 12,
22, 11, 33, 9, 23, 36, 0]
2 [15, 34, 27, 29, 36, 32, 18,
23, 0, 37, 19, 39, 8, 33, 5, 31,
17, 28, 25, 2, 20, 4, 10, 7, 24,
1, 30, 13, 12, 6, 38, 26, 21,
16, 35, 22, 11, 3, 14, 9]
2 [15, 34, 27, 29, 36, 32, 18,
23, 0, 37, 19, 39, 8, 33, 5, 31,
17, 28, 25, 2, 20, 4, 10, 7, 24,
1, 30, 13, 12, 6, 38, 26, 21,
16, 35, 22, 11, 3, 14, 9]
3 [14, 24, 22, 11, 30, 20, 31,
18, 16, 27, 2, 19, 3, 0, 15, 36,
10, 39, 1, 25, 21, 23, 4, 28,
38, 6, 26, 9, 17, 37, 34, 7, 33,
35, 13, 8, 5, 32, 12, 29]
3 [22, 9, 18, 2, 4, 15, 35, 36,
25, 31, 11, 34, 20, 5, 21, 39,
1, 24, 12, 30, 0, 29, 28, 32,
38, 23, 33, 26, 17, 37, 3, 19,
7, 27, 10, 16, 6, 13, 14, 8]
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
37 [9, 22, 0, 27, 20, 6, 10, 18, 8,
16, 25, 26, 3, 13, 39, 19, 31,
15, 7, 5, 32, 17, 1, 12, 37, 14,
35, 2, 29, 4, 21, 38, 23, 34,
30, 24, 11, 33, 28, 36]
37 [1, 10, 6, 37, 14, 31, 36, 24,
30, 21, 5, 15, 19, 18, 28, 7, 2,
27, 13, 0, 9, 3, 25, 32, 26, 34,
20, 23, 16, 12, 22, 39, 29, 35,
38, 11, 17, 8, 4, 33]
38 [3, 36, 21, 28, 31, 23, 24, 34,
18, 20, 2, 39, 25, 8, 33, 4, 35,
22, 5, 14, 0, 26, 9, 13, 30, 12,
7, 1, 15, 17, 27, 16, 37, 11,
10, 38, 32, 29, 6, 19]
38 [27, 11, 16, 8, 1, 31, 10, 20,
39, 24, 32, 2, 3, 5, 34, 12, 29,
37, 18, 7, 19, 14, 15, 13, 35,
22, 30, 23, 4, 17, 26, 36, 0,
25, 28, 33, 6, 9, 38, 21]
39 [7, 9, 27, 6, 16, 10, 0, 34, 3,
28, 29, 25, 13, 26, 11, 15, 20,
18, 38, 37, 30, 31, 1, 19, 2,
35, 33, 8, 24, 5, 17, 32, 39,
36, 21, 14, 4, 23, 22, 12]
39 [21, 20, 4, 17, 10, 14, 0, 28,
22, 38, 31, 18, 19, 33, 1, 29,
7, 11, 32, 6, 26, 24, 13, 12,
30, 5, 3, 27, 23, 37, 34, 8, 36,
25, 2, 15, 16, 39, 9, 35]
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Table 19: Preferences for 50 * 50 marriage model
Women ID Woman Preferences Men ID Man Preferences
0 [31, 43, 35, 23, 14, 0, 5, 28,
26, 36, 48, 27, 40, 19, 3, 41,
25, 12, 44, 8, 4, 22, 21, 39,
30, 46, 45, 13, 11, 38, 32, 47,
2, 6, 9, 42, 24, 17, 16, 49, 37,
15, 1, 34, 20, 29, 10, 18, 7,
33]
0 [18, 39, 16, 6, 22, 9, 36, 31,
11, 34, 37, 14, 44, 26, 23, 43,
30, 12, 38, 48, 15, 25, 42, 7,
29, 35, 45, 3, 49, 27, 8, 40,
46, 13, 4, 1, 47, 2, 28, 17, 41,
0, 20, 33, 21, 5, 19, 24, 10,
32]
1 [33, 43, 38, 9, 10, 41, 47, 30,
49, 32, 25, 13, 42, 0, 37, 31,
23, 1, 5, 21, 22, 8, 35, 44, 48,
6, 12, 36, 14, 45, 2, 34, 19,
40, 39, 16, 7, 28, 29, 26, 20,
24, 11, 17, 46, 15, 4, 18, 27,
3]
1 [47, 19, 12, 26, 30, 28, 38, 2,
33, 21, 9, 18, 40, 46, 49, 1,
42, 10, 29, 5, 41, 20, 3, 6, 11,
48, 44, 32, 27, 14, 34, 45, 23,
36, 15, 39, 0, 37, 16, 31, 13,
22, 7, 8, 24, 4, 35, 25, 43, 17]
2 [0, 14, 43, 23, 20, 17, 39, 1,
31, 10, 13, 12, 7, 25, 36, 49,
40, 16, 22, 46, 33, 38, 19, 35,
4, 18, 26, 15, 32, 3, 11, 6, 37,
48, 34, 42, 45, 2, 21, 27, 41,
47, 24, 29, 44, 28, 5, 8, 9, 30]
2 [13, 19, 31, 15, 5, 9, 1, 32,
48, 24, 36, 29, 34, 7, 23, 2,
42, 21, 35, 30, 3, 39, 33, 18,
45, 17, 25, 49, 8, 44, 28, 12,
22, 43, 27, 14, 38, 41, 26, 20,
4, 16, 40, 11, 46, 6, 10, 0, 47,
37]
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
48 [3, 43, 36, 21, 6, 42, 34, 29,
38, 41, 4, 39, 33, 17, 11, 10,
27, 26, 5, 25, 18, 40, 0, 37,
13, 28, 8, 20, 49, 44, 30, 48,
14, 22, 31, 32, 1, 16, 15, 24,
23, 2, 35, 47, 9, 12, 45, 7, 19,
46]
48 [28, 31, 37, 9, 14, 7, 22, 10,
42, 19, 33, 3, 6, 43, 46, 1, 39,
45, 11, 24, 15, 48, 16, 12, 40,
49, 17, 25, 21, 27, 29, 8, 26,
5, 35, 36, 38, 20, 4, 41, 44,
32, 0, 47, 2, 18, 30, 13, 34,
23]
49 [16, 24, 10, 31, 38, 9, 45, 12,
26, 39, 14, 22, 17, 23, 37, 1,
4, 19, 7, 20, 8, 30, 46, 28, 21,
47, 33, 18, 6, 27, 44, 49, 3,
41, 42, 32, 40, 35, 15, 34, 25,
36, 29, 48, 11, 5, 0, 43, 13, 2]
49 [21, 6, 32, 9, 4, 48, 38, 26, 3,
41, 46, 36, 17, 18, 13, 25, 14,
31, 29, 8, 20, 35, 5, 22, 23,
42, 44, 12, 27, 33, 15, 28, 30,
39, 45, 10, 43, 37, 19, 16, 2,
24, 0, 34, 7, 11, 1, 49, 40, 47]
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Table 20: Preferences for 60 * 60 marriage model
Women ID Woman Preferences Men ID Man Preferences
0 [39, 38, 34, 50, 44, 36, 48,
25, 13, 47, 18, 12, 51, 31, 10,
1, 41, 43, 23, 46, 24, 20, 42,
26, 22, 56, 16, 57, 19, 55, 21,
49, 17, 28, 40, 2, 27, 54, 32,
30, 53, 59, 15, 3, 45, 58, 5,
52, 29, 6, 9, 0, 33, 4, 35, 14,
8, 37, 7, 11]
0 [44, 27, 30, 46, 9, 18, 20, 6,
25, 34, 2, 54, 13, 17, 12, 48,
36, 52, 28, 14, 16, 59, 4, 11,
49, 29, 8, 7, 41, 33, 32, 55,
40, 31, 1, 24, 51, 57, 47, 45,
35, 37, 53, 56, 5, 39, 3, 38, 0,
19, 58, 23, 21, 15, 10, 43, 50,
26, 22, 42]
1 [32, 52, 16, 4, 13, 27, 20, 23,
1, 0, 24, 50, 56, 40, 8, 54, 10,
49, 53, 14, 9, 30, 19, 22, 15,
7, 26, 31, 36, 39, 2, 3, 29, 21,
33, 34, 28, 41, 11, 38, 35, 59,
42, 51, 58, 55, 46, 25, 17, 43,
44, 45, 48, 6, 18, 5, 57, 47,
37, 12]
1 [52, 22, 30, 10, 56, 48, 14,
33, 19, 18, 27, 23, 35, 41, 21,
37, 55, 49, 34, 39, 12, 13, 50,
29, 2, 6, 43, 45, 53, 8, 4, 46,
17, 31, 3, 9, 51, 25, 59, 58,
16, 40, 57, 7, 28, 20, 47, 38,
0, 1, 42, 11, 24, 5, 15, 44, 36,
32, 54, 26]
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
58 [25, 0, 41, 57, 9, 6, 47, 55,
34, 38, 29, 43, 12, 32, 30, 26,
17, 44, 56, 49, 50, 28, 33, 45,
11, 16, 15, 54, 13, 36, 10, 35,
21, 42, 31, 58, 23, 51, 48, 53,
2, 22, 24, 59, 14, 1, 20, 39, 3,
5, 40, 8, 4, 52, 7, 18, 37, 27,
46, 19]
58 [28, 5, 30, 17, 57, 52, 12, 31,
13, 51, 19, 47, 55, 41, 42, 11,
44, 49, 25, 23, 58, 15, 53, 21,
46, 20, 6, 39, 3, 32, 34, 29,
22, 2, 43, 38, 10, 18, 27, 8,
16, 0, 54, 59, 36, 48, 33, 40,
50, 35, 1, 26, 24, 4, 7, 45, 14,
9, 56, 37]
59 [48, 57, 25, 18, 22, 8, 21, 11,
41, 15, 54, 1, 50, 24, 17, 59,
2, 12, 3, 5, 43, 29, 37, 20, 35,
0, 6, 38, 45, 39, 51, 49, 4, 34,
7, 46, 52, 23, 40, 44, 31, 33,
55, 10, 42, 36, 9, 47, 19, 27,
58, 14, 28, 56, 53, 30, 13, 26,
16, 32]
59 [44, 27, 53, 50, 1, 7, 33, 35,
43, 32, 28, 59, 12, 11, 45, 18,
30, 52, 54, 36, 26, 0, 41, 16,
13, 31, 20, 40, 47, 38, 15, 4,
21, 9, 5, 14, 6, 2, 10, 39, 8,
49, 57, 29, 51, 34, 42, 3, 37,
56, 55, 19, 25, 17, 23, 22, 24,
48, 58, 46]
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The results illustrate the RADA algorithm can save time by minimizing the running time
of the operation “decision making" while keeping the running time of operation “sending
request" the same.
Table 21: 30 * 30 Man optimal stable matching
Woman ID 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Man ID 24 5 18 20 13 10 23 19 14 12
Woman ID 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19
Man ID 28 9 6 7 21 11 22 17 3 26
Woman ID 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29
Man ID 2 8 4 1 27 25 16 0 15 29
Table 22: Running time for 30 * 30 Man optimal stable matching (millisecond)
Deferred 59.60 45.44 60.89 56.08 43.92 47.88 46.79 52.39 58.03 55.12
operation 7.60 9.36 8.59 7.67 10.59 7.95 9.28 7.28 8.29 7.94
6.3 Re-matching-Based Algorithm and Repair Based Al-
gorithm
Moving to the dynamic market, we discuss the temporary labor market. Facing the various
agents in various time intervals in this market, we need to constantly update stable matching
to meet different agents via the re-matching algorithm or the repair-based algorithm. Both
algorithms can all find recursively stable matches for the market with different agents.
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Table 23: 40 * 40 Man optimal stable matching
Woman ID 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Man ID 18 32 6 22 28 1 21 35 21 3
Woman ID 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19
Man ID 24 16 31 30 37 33 29 15 17 27
Woman ID 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29
Man ID 39 19 11 26 13 9 36 25 4 12
Woman ID 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39
Man ID 7 34 11 10 2 5 14 20 8 0
Table 24: Running time for 40 * 40 Man optimal stable matching (millisecond)
Deferred 56.45 41.99 48.44 35.59 48.82 39.72 45.73 40.22 46.69 46.61
operation 10.46 9.54 8.36 11.04 8.71 8.07 8.81 8.73 8.69 7.94
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Both algorithms behave in terms of running time, but they are different in the aspect of
result consistency. The concept aims to improve the satisfaction of agents in the market by
protecting agents from variations resulting from each iteration of the re-matching algorithm
or the repairing algorithm
6.3.1 Experiment 3
I designed a experiment to compare two algorithms in terms of result consistency. I obtain
an optimal stable matching via the deferred acceptance algorithm and then take off 4 em-
ployers and 4 employees randomly, then recalculate twice through the re-matching-based
algorithm and the repair-based algorithm to obtain two new stable matches. Based on this,
we can calculate the result consistency for the two different algorithms. The result is in
Table 25 Table 26
Table 25: Result consistency for size = 30 with 4 * 4 leaving
Algorithm Result Consistency
Repair 61.53% 69.23% 53.84% 73.07% 61.53%
Re-match 38.46% 50% 53.84% 61.53% 53.84%
Table 26: Result consistency for size = 40 with 4 * 4 leaving
Algorithm Result Consistency
Repair 80.55% 69.44% 83.33% 75% 77.78%
Re-match 75% 63.89% 52.77% 66.67% 61.11%
After comparing, I notice that the repair algorithm is more consistent than re-matching-
based algorithm when 4 * 4 agents from both sides leave based on samples where agents
number 30 * 30 and 40 * 40.
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6.3.2 Experiment 4
To further analyze the algorithms, we execute them based on the same context with 8 * 8
agents from both sides leaving. The result is in Table 27. We can find in most situations,
Table 27: Result consistency for size = 30 with 8 * 8 leaving
Algorithm Result Consistency
Repair 59.09% 63.63% 59.09% 59.09% 59.09%
Re-match 50% 59.09% 63.63% 59.09% 40.90%
Table 28: Result consistency for size = 40 with 8 * 8 leaving
Algorithm Result Consistency
Repair 71.87% 68.75% 65.62% 43.75% 50%
Re-match 40.62% 59.37% 34.37% 50% 50%
the repair-based algorithm does better than re-matching algorithm. This is because the
repair-based algorithm obtains the new result based on the last result before changes occur,
while the re-matching-based computes a stable match based on new context completely.
The re-matching-based can guarantee that each time the result is the sender (candidate)
optimal stable matching, but the repair-based algorithm can not.
6.4 Result Consistency in All Stable Matching
When randomly remove 4 based one 30 * 30 preferences, we get 7262 stable matches,




In this chapter, I mainly discussed these algorithms in the view of its efficiency. I simulate
several possible situations to show their differences in the aspect of efficiency. All of the
experiments can be divided into three kinds. The first kinds of experiments try to show
the differences between the deferred acceptance algorithm and the request-accumulated
deferred acceptance algorithm. The second kinds of the experiments mainly aim to show
the variance of the re-matching-based algorithm and the repair-based algorithm from the
view point of result consistency. The result consistency is positively related to the customer
satisfactory. The final kinds of experiments are designed to show the distance of the repair
based algorithm to the ideal situation. I can draw the conclusion that the repair-based
algorithm can improve the efficiency and effectiveness in terms of dynamic market where
the system need to assign the matching between agents from one side to the other side’s.
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Chapter 7
Conclusion and Future Work
This thesis solves the problem occurring in the temporary labor market for recruitment
agencies. The main efforts addresses in proposing and implementing a two-sided matching
algorithm. Such algorithm considers the characteristics in the dynamic temporary recruit-
ing market. This chapter summarizes the main contributions of this work are summarized
as below:
1. In the problem analysis section, we analyzed the abstract problem by using EBD
methodology, through three rounds of digging. Also, we applied the two-sided
matching algorithm to solve our problem.
2. A request-accumulated deferred acceptance algorithm is developed. This algorithm
inherits the idea of classical deferred acceptance algorithm to get a stable match. The
RADA algorithm retains the number of the times of the operation “sending request"
while decreasing the number of the times of the operation “decision making". Com-
pared to the deferred acceptance algorithm, our RADA algorithm can reduce to fulfill
the design requirement of fast responsiveness in the dynamic market.
3. A repair-based algorithm is designed for the dynamic market. Not only can it renew
its stable match as the changes happen in the market, but also it can also improve
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the result’s consistency, compared to the re-matching based algorithm. The repair-
based algorithm fixes the unstable match caused by the market’s changes, which is
better than simply repeating the deferred acceptance algorithm to generate a new
stable match. This algorithm makes good use of previous stable match, improving
the result’s consistency, further improving customer satisfaction.
The two-sided matching algorithms proposed in this thesis takes into account both static
service market and continuous dynamic service markets. For static two-sided matching
market, compared to the deferred acceptance algorithm, the RADA algorithm aims to min-
imize program running time by decreasing execution times of operation “decision making"
while maintaining the execution times of operation “sending request". The RADA algo-
rithm uses 90% less “decision making" operations, resulting in sharply reduced running
time.
The algorithms for dynamic two-sided matching market are designed based on the re-
matching-based and the repair-based matching models. The re-matching-based algorithm
is straightforward and easy to implement. However, it does not maintain result consistency
with the previous matching solution. The repair-based matching algorithm can generate
a stable matching and, at the same time, maintains good matching consistency. We also
designed the repair-based algorithms to accommodate preference changes from the sender
(candidate). Also, we tried to improve matching consistency by exploring various repairing
methods for dynamic two-sided matching markets.
For research direction, the RADA algorithm can be combined to the “re-matching-
based" algorithm, catering for the requirement of distributed dynamic market using the
“divide-conquer" concept. In this case, the two-sided matching algorithm can be applied in
the field of big data. It can be explored in more broader market.
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